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LVTHE DEMAND FOR CURRENcY RELATIVE
TO THE TOTAL MONEY SUPPLY'
PHILLIP CAGAN
University of Chicago
public's demand for currency as
a fraction of the total money sup-
ply has long interested economists
well as bankers. Under fractional-
banking, a withdrawal of depos-
s in (non-bank) currency reduces bank
and, unless reserves were pre-
iously in excess of the desired level or
re otherwise replenished, forces a mu!-
pie contraction of earning assets and
eposits. A deposit of currency augments
ank reserves and allows a multiple ex-
ansion of earning assets and deposits.
'hus the public's conversion of its cash
alances from one form to the other, if
ot offset by other factors, alters the ag-
regate amount of the money supply as
as its composition. This effect on the
supply, unlike changes in bank
1Thisstudy is part of a project of the National
ireau of Economic Research under the over-all
rection of Milton Friedman. His suggestions guid-
the work in its initial stages and helped greatly
improve the final product. Generous help was also
ceived from Anna J. Schwartz, whose extensive
towledge of this material made her comments espe-
thy useful. Solomon Fabricant, Edward J. Kilherg,
lorris Mendelson, and George J. Stigler also made
•eful comments. Not allthese people entirely
:reed with the interpretation of some of the find-
gs, and it should not be assumed that they accept
e conclusions without reservations.
The paper has been approved for publication as
report of the National Bureau of Economic Re-
irch by the Director of Research and the Board
Directors of the National Bureau, in accordance
th the resolution of the board governing National
reports (see the Annual Report of the Na-
ned Bureau of Economic Research).Itisre-
iinted, with the addition of an appendix on data
d sources, as No. 62 in the National Bureau's series
Occasional Papers.
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reserve ratios or issues of Treasury and
Federal Reserve money, is not subject to
direct control by the monetary authori-
ties. However, it can be offset by appro-
priate open market operations of the
central bank and so is an important con-
sideration in planning monetary meas-
ure$.
There has been a good deal of specula-
tion about the factors that underlie the
demand for currency, but empirical in-
quiry has been limited chiefly to seasonal
variations in demand because adequate
data covering a long period were not
available. New estimates of the United
States money supply since 1875 remedy
this deficiency.2 Figure 1 shows the ratio
of currency to the total money supply3
annually from 1875 to 1955. This article
deals with the behavior and determinants
of this ratio, mainly in the long run. A
separate study of its short-run cyclical
movements is in preparation.
The currency ratio has varied consid-
erably. It was above 30 per cent just
after the resumption of gold payments in
1879 and gradually declined to just over
7 per cent by 1930. Subsequently it rose
to 20 per cent during World War II and
2Theseestimates were developed by Milton
Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz. The Supply of
Money in the United Slates, a forthcoming publica-
tion of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Currency is defined as the hand-to-hand notes
and coin issues outside banks of the United States
Treasury, Federal Reserve banks, and (until 1935)
national banks. The total money supply is currency
plus the demand and time deposits of all commercial
banks held by the non-banking public.then fell to 15 per cent in 1955. The larg-
estshort-runincreasescame during
\'Vorld Wars I and II and in the early
1930's.
These movements cannot in the main
be explained by any simple correspond-
ence with the trends of one or two eco-
nomic factors, and in this respect the
currency ratio differs notably from most
other monetary variables. A favorite ex-
planation of the early decline in the ratio
is that an increasing proportion of the
people's awareness of them. This ma
have contributed to the early decline c
the ratio. But the decline continued ion
after there could have been many peopi
still left who failed to adopt the bankin
habit simply because they were ignoran
of its advantages. The number of bank
increased faster in the West than in th
East, probably because the West wa
sparsely settled and many small bank
could serve the growing but scattere
population better than a few large banks
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I _I
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FIG. 1.—Ratio of currency to the money supply annually, 1875—1955
population gradually became familiar
with banking.4 Banking spread rapidly
through the West in the half-century
preceding World Warincreasing the
availability of checking accounts and
See, for example, Irving Fisher, "Will the Up-
ward Trend of Prices Continue?" American Econom-
ic Review, II (September, 1912), 547—49; and A. C.
Pigou, Essays in A pplied Economics (London: P. S.
King, 1924), pp. 184—85.
In 1880 the states west of the Mississippi (in-
clucling all of Louisiana and Minnesota) had 26 per
cent of the country's commercial banks and 22 per
cent of the population; in 1914, these states had 50
per cent of the commercial banks and only 30 per
cent of the population (see Annual Report of the
Comptroller of Ike Currency [18801, pp. lxxxvi—ix; and
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Banking and Monetary Statistics, Table 8).
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In any event, the later increases in th
ratio point to the influence of factoi
unrelated in any simple way to trends i
the growth of the banking habit, an
these same factors may account for
substantial part of the early decline i
the ratio. Indeed, the number of factoi
deserving considerationis, by norma
standards of empirical analysis,
ingly large, and the evidence suggesi
that no one of them has predominate
throughout the period since 1875.
The following sections assess the in
portance of the various factors that coul
have produced substantial variations i








S.SL.Lsses all the variables that seem likley
) affect appreciably the public's desire
) hold part of its total money balances
i the form of currency. This discussion
icludes some preliminary comment on
ie measurement of these variables and,
rhere possible, on their importance. Sub-
sections analyze their effects on
Lie currency ratio.
I. VARIABLES AFFECTING THE
CURRENCY RATIO
The desired level of the currency ratio
epends on individuals' preferences for
Lirrency or deposits in the light of the
Dsts and advantages of holding these or
ther assets. An individual can easily and
uickly make the actual ratio of his cur-
to total money balances equal to
Lie desired ratio by exchanging his de-
osits for currency or vice versa. This
ssumes that there are no restrictions on
Liis exchange from the supply side, and
ormally this is so. However, during cer-
financial crises—1857, 1873, 1893,
907, and 1933—banks suspended con-
ertibility. At these times individuals
ould not exchange deposits for currency,
nd the desired currency ratio undoubt-
ly exceeded the actual ratio (produc-
g, as a consequence, a premium on cur-
At all other times the presump-
on that the actual and the desired ratios
e equal seems valid.
The economic theory of demand sug-
sts that the expected cost of holding
rrency in lieu of deposits is likely to be
e of the major determinants of the de-
red ratio. Given the cost of holding cur-
ncy, the desired ratio will then reflect
ie comparative advantages of holding
rrency and deposits. These advan-
ges might depend on such variables as
pected real income per capita, the vol-
e of retail trade, the volume of travel
r capita, the degree of urbanization,
3
and the rate of tax on transactions.6
There are numerous other possible long-
run influences on the currency ratio, and
some will be considered briefly later.
Most of these neither help to explain the
long-run decline in the ratio nor seem
relevant to its short-run movements, and
therefore they will not receive much at-
tention.
1.THE COSTOF HOLDING CXTRRENCY
A rise in the cost of holding currency
leads people to substitute deposits for
currency, and conversely. The foregone
cost of holding currency is measured by
the current rate of return on deposits,
since currency typically yields no nomi-
nal return. While all deposits once paid
interest, the average return on demand
deposits has been negative since 1934 be-
cause service charges have exceeded in-
terest payments. Time deposits, on the
other hand, have always paid interest, al-
though the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation and the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System jointly set
maximum rates for insured banks.
Interest paid less service charges on
deposits, however, is not the
measure of the cost of holding currency;
we should use the expected net rate of re-
turn. Before the introduction of deposit
insurance in the 1930's, deposits were not
as safe as currency against losses result-
ing from changes in economic conditions.
The payment of a deposit might be de-
layed or defaulted if a bank became in-
solvent. Such losses reduce the net return
to deposits. Individuals' expectations of
losses should be deducted from the aver-
age rate of interest paid, to find the ex-
pected net return. Subjective expecta-
The possible effects of most of these variables
on the currency ratio have been recognized before
(see, e.g., Irving Fisher, The Pl4rchasing Power of
Money [New York: Macmillan Co., 1926], pp. 51—52
and 165; and Pigou, op. cii.).tions cannot be measured directly, but it
is a plausible hypothesis that expecta-
tions of the future rate of loss on deposits
are based on past experience and so de-
pend largely on some average of past
rates of loss. Such a measure of expected
loss has been used in the statistical analy-
sis reported below.
2. EXPECTED REAL INCOME PER CAPITA
Checking deposits offer a convenient
method of exchanging money without
risk of loss in transit; they also provide a
permanent receipt for debts paid. In ad-
dition, holding balances in reputable
banks avoids the hazards of keeping cur-
rency on hand. These advantages may
well mean that the services of a dollar of
deposits are preferred to those of a dollar
of currency. If so, the currency ratio
would tend to decline as real income per
capita rose, other things, such as the
comparative rates of return on the two
kinds of assets, remaining constant. That
is, both deposits and currency are consid-
ered superior to other assets as a form of
holding wealth, but not equally so, de-
posits being superior to currency.7 This
does not mean that, for a given level of
income, deposits are preferred to cur-
rency, no matter how large a fraction of
money balances is already held as depos-
its; if this were so, no currency would be
held at all, since some deposits pay inter-
est and currency pays none. For a given
size of the total balance, a sufficiently
For evidence on the historical superiority of
money over other assets see Richard Selden, "A
Study of Monetary Velocity in the United States,"
in Milton Friedman (ed.), Studies in the Quantity
Theory of Money (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1956), Part V.
For some purposes it may be preferable to define
the superiority of assets in terms of changes in total
wealth rather than of changes in income, as is done
in the text. The empirical difficulties o measuring
total wealth, however, largely rule out the former
approach.
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small fraction held as currency makes
extra dollar of currency preferable
an extra dollar of deposits. Nevertheles
it may still be true that, beyond th
point in the size of the balance and in ti
corresponding level of income, thei:
come elasticity of deposits is greater thi
that of currency. A rise in real incon
would then lead to a decline in the cu
rency ratio. As we shall see, the high
income elasticity of deposits appears
explain most of the long-run decline i
the ratio.
Since real income proves to be an ir
portant determinant ofthe currenc
ratio, shifts in the distribution of incon
may also affect the ratio and might do
even if the ratio of total money balanc
to money income for each income grou
were unchanged. The share of total 1:
come received bythelower-incon
groups has increased over time, whic
may have worked to increase the cu
rency ratio. The effects of such shifts a
difficult to distinguish from those of ti
gradual rise in real income, however, b
cause our information on them is limite
to a few points in time. I have not a
tempted to analyze them, and the o
served effect of changes in real incon
probably incorporates any effect pr
duced by long-run changes in the di
tribution of income.
3. THE VOLUME OP RETAIL TRADE
One advantage of currency over d
positsiswideacceptability.Chec
signed by a person unknown toti
drawee can prove to be worthless and.
are customarily not honored until
clear the drawer's bank. Because of ti
time usually required for clearings,
use of checks is limited to transactions
which delayed payment creates no di
ficulties. Where wide acceptability is ii
portant, as in cash-and-carry transaLons between strangers, the use of cur-
predominates. If we suppose that a
onstant fraction of retail transactions
wolves the use of currency and that this
raction is substantially higher than for
ther types of transactions, then the cur-
ency ratio would vary directly with
)ng-run movements in the fraction of
otal transactions made through retail
tores. Such a relation is the main ex-
danation of seasonal variations in the
urrency ratio: the ratio typically reaches
ts high point for the year during the
spurt in retail trade. Can this
elation explain long-run movements in
he currency ratio?
There are no figures on the fraction of
,otal transactions made through retail
tores. Statistics on money flows, which
ielp to fill this deficiency, cover only the
lery recent period. It is still possible to
udge roughly the long-run behavior of
.his fraction by looking at the product of
wo of its components: (a) the value of
sold through retail stores as a frac-
ion of the value of total commodity out-
ut and (b) the value of total commodity
utput as a fraction of total transac-
ions.8
Estimates of the first component are
hown in Table 1 by decades from 1879
o 1949. The fraction of total output fun-
.eled through retail trade, as measured
y these figures, has changed little. Over
he entire period the estimated fraction
within 5 percentage points of 70 per
.ent. These figures even overstate the
'ariability in the importance of retail
8Thesetwo fractions take no account of pur-
bases of consumer services, which presumably are
aid for with currency to roughly the same extent as
ther retail transactions. The growth of consumer
rvices has outstripped that of commodities and
robably also that of total transactions and has pro-
uced a rise over time in the proportionate use of
urrency. It does not, therefore, account for the long-
in decline in the currency ratio.
outlets. There is a slight upward bias in
the trend of the percentage arising from
the unavoidable inclusion in the denomi-
nator of a declining quantity of goods
exchanged through barter; for our pur-
poses the denominator should measure
only goods sold in exchange for money.
The second component—the value of
total commodity output as a fraction of
total transactions—could change radi-
5
TABLE 1*
GOODS SOLD THROUGH RETAIL STORES












Place in the American Economy since 1869
(NationalBureauofEconomicResearch,
1955), Table 10, line 6 times line 8.
cally over time only if the volume of
wholesale and financial transactions or
consumer services (discussed in n.8)
changed substantially relative to total
commodity output. A relative rise in
wholesaleandfinancialtransactions,
which are conducted mostly with checks,
would decrease the currency ratio. We
do not know whether such a rise has oc-
curred, but, even if it has, its effect on the
currency ratio has probably been slight
because a fairly large part of total money
holdings is held by individuals. If the im-
portance of wholesale and financial trans-
actions has been growing, presumably
the proportion of total cash balances held
by businesses, which make most of these
transactions, has also. The money hold-
ings of all businesses, including non-bank
financial intermediaries, has been only
about 30 per cent of the total in recentdecades,° however, and this includes the
holdings of the large number of busi-
nesses engaged in retail trade, which are
not reported separately.
It seems likely that a decline in the
fraction of all transactions made through
firms that sell directly to the public has
not been an important factor producing
the long-run decline in the currency
ratio
4. THE VOLUME OP TRAVEL PER CAPITA
The amount of currency used to trans-
act a given volume of retail trade may
nonetheless varysubstantially.Since
payments by check require that parties
to a transaction be known to each other,
currency islikely to supplant checks
when a person buys where he is not
known or when he does not have the op-
portunity to establish a line of credit.
These difficulties bother travelers in all
transactions, and we might expect a di-
rect relation between the currency ratio
and an index of travel."
An index of miles traveled per capita,
which is the best measure we can get, is
far from perfect for present purposes.
The increasing speed of transportation
allows a person to travel the same dis-
tance in less time and therefore perhaps
This percentage covers currency and commer-
cial bank deposits only (see reports on liquid-asset
holdings in Federal Reserve Bulletin and Solomon
Shapiro, Distribution of Deposits and Curren-
cy in the United States, 1929—39," Journal of 1/ic
American Statislical Association, XXXVIII [Decem-
ber, 1943], 438—44). Savings and loan associations
are included with financial intermediaries in this
percentage, although they are not so treated in the
first source cited.
10Changesin the form of retail transactions may
also have affected the currency ratio. Thus, for ex-
ample, the growth in sales of consumer durables,
which involve a lump-sum payment unless bought
on the instalment plan and are conveniently pur-
chased by check, has undoubtedly stimulated the
use of checks. I have not analyzed this factor, be-
cause it seems less important for the period preced-
ing 1900, when the decline in the currency ratio was
greatest, but such effects of the form of retail trans-
actions on the currency ratio deserve further study.
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with less need for currency. The need £
currency probably rises more with ti
duration of the trip than with the nuli
ber of miles covered. Nevertheless, ti
number of miles of intercity travel
capifa by passengers on all forms
transportation (cars, buses, trains, ai
planes, and boats) should reflect maj
changes in the demand for currency an
ing from the inconveniences of paying J
check when away from home. Such a
index of travel was constructed for ti
period 1921—51. It has a strong upwai
trend and little year-to-year fluctuatioi
owing to the persistent growth in aut
mobile travel, which makes up most
the total except during the early 1920'
The volume of travel thus seems unabl
to explain the major fluctuations in tF
currency ratio since World War I, am
because the long-run trend of travel
almost surely been upward, it cannot
plain the long-run decline in the rati
before World War I.
The possibility that travel account
for part of the wartime increase in
use of currency will be considered latei
otherwise we may disregard this facto:
5. THEDEGREEOF
There are two possible effects of
banization on the currency ratio
work in opposite directions. First, urbar
ization,liketravel,causes peoplet
UTravelmay cause increases in the use of tra'
eler's checks, which are best classified as a form
currency, but such increases would reduce, rath
than raise, the currency ratio as computed for Fig.
That ratio includes banks' traveler's checks in ti
denominator with deposits because of the impos
bility of segregating them in the basic data. Tray
er's checks have formed a very small fraction of t
total money supply, however, and could not possib
be important for explaining the variations in t
Currency ratio.
The outstanding traveler's checks of the Ame
can Express Company, which can be estimated a
nually from its balance sheet, have not been includ
in the money figures. This company is said to iss
about half of the total traveler's checks outstandin
It is the only non-bank issuer.'ade where they are not known, which
)uld reduce the use of checks. Historical
:counts suggest that it was once much
Lore common for laborers to buy on
edit between pay periods, at least in
nail communities, and to pay their ac-
imulated debts on payday. Payment of
purchases in this way would de-
the use of currency relative to de-
osits. The growth of cities may have re-
uced this practice and so have increased
ie use of currency. To be sure, charge
xounts are still widely used even in
cities, but their over-all importance
iay have decreased. Certainly the im-
ersonal nature of urban trade itself dis-
the use of checks and credit, al-
iough we do not know how seriously.
should consider the possibility that
us effect has been important.
A second, quite different, effect of ur-
anization on the currency ratio is some-
.mes deduced from various facts sug-
esting that larger bank deposits are held
y individuals in cities than in the coun-
The implication drawn is that urban
fe provides familiarity with the advan-
gesthe banking habit. For example, the
ayment of wages by check is more corn-
ion in urban than in rural employments.
'he inconveniences of banking by mail
id the possible inefficiencies of small
anks may also have limited the spread
banking in rural communities, though
ilythe most sparsely settled areas
ould seem to be unable to support one
ank, or at least a branch of a nearby
ank. Branch banking is illegal in many
ates, but it is questionable whether this
rohibition would have endured if rural
had demanded banking fa-
lities that could be supplied economi-
illy only by branch banks.
While the use of bank deposits relative
income is possibly lower in rural areas
ian in cities, the same can be said of
7
currency. All the preceding argument
says is that rural areas have less demand
for all kinds of money than cities do, or
at least that they probably did until
quite recently because barter was preva-
lent in frontier areas and because wages
were paid partly in kind. This implies
nothing about the proportionate demand
for currency and deposits. The question
is whether migrants from rural areas to
cities become familiar with banking prac-
tices and expand their use of checking
facilities at the expense of currency.
Without evidence, there is little basis on
which to judge.
Combining the second effect of ur-
banization with thefirst throws the
over-all effect of this variable into doubt.
These two supposed effects of urbaniza-
tion on the currency ratio work in op-
posite directions, and there is no a priori
basis for expecting their net effect to
work one way or the other.'2
The nature of the data largely rules
out a resolution of this problem by time-
series analysis. Urbanization has pro-
ceeded very steadily,'3 affording little
There are other possible indirect effects of ur-
banization. Here is one: A change in the average pay
period over time could produce a change in the cur-
rency ratio. For example, longer periods between in-
come receipts would require larger money balances
and would lead to the deposit of a larger fraction of
such balances in banks by households in order to
avoid holding too large an amount in currency. What
evidence there is suggests that the pay period has
declined through the years as part of the urbaniza-
tion process, because of the tendency of urban fac-
tories to adopt shorter pay periods than have been
common in rural employments. Changes in the pay
period, therefore, cannot explain the long-run de-
cline in the currency ratio.
13Bureauof the Census figures on the percentage
of the United States population in urban centers







It seems unlikely that the pattern of these figures





1950 59chance to disentangle its effects statisti-
cally from those of real income, which has
also grown fairly steadily.
It is nonetheless clear that urbaniza-
tion, whatever the direction in which it
operates, has not played a dominant role
in determining the currency ratio. If ur-
banization increased the use of currency,
it could not account for the steady de-
cline in the ratio. If urbanization on bal-
ance reduces the use of currency, its
largest conceivable effect accounts for
only two-fifths of the decline in the ratio.
To see this, let us make the extreme as-
sumption that urban residents use no
currency whatsoever. Then the amount
of urbanization that occurred from 1880
to 1910, when the effect of this variable
on the currency ratio seems to have been
the greatest, would have produced but 42
per cent of the observed decline in the
ratio.'4 With a more realistic assumption
about the use of currency by urban resi-
14Letstand for the average currency ratio per
person in urban centers, and mu for the average size
of total cash balances held by each person in urban
centers as a proportion of the average size through-
out the United States. The subscript r will denote
rural areas, and U and R will denote population in
urban and rural areas, respectively. Then the aggre-
gate currency ratio, Ca,canbe represented by (U\IR
Ca= Cu +m,.
In 1880 Ca was 0.31, and the proportion of the popu-
lation in rural areas was 0.72. Setting Cu equal to zero
gives the maximum decline in Ca from urbanization,
because any rise in the first term of the identity off-
sets the decline in the second term. Assuming that
Cu equals zero, then, and substituting the foregoing
values into the identity, we have
0.31=0+c1m,(0,72), or O.43'crmr.
For 1910, assuming no change in regional ratios ex-
cept for the proportion of the population in rural
areas, which fell to 0.54, we have
0.23 =0+0.43(0.54).
This gives a maximum decline in Ca 01(0.31 —0.23),
or 0.08, which is 42 per cent of the observed decline
of (0.31 —0.12),or 0.19.
dents, much less of the actual decii
could be attributed to urbanization.
Cross-sectional analysis can cast fu
ther light on the effect of urbanizatio
on the currency ratio. Two types of suc
analyses could be useful. One could con
pare over time different regions of tF
United States that had substantially di
ferent rates of urbanization. The oth
could make an international comparisoi
The first is presently ruled out by th
absence of data on currency holdings b
regions, without which any direct est
mate of regional currency ratios is
sible. Barred from the first type of anal3
sis, I shall use the second. However, th
lack of good monetary and populatio
statistics for most countries limits con
parison to one foreign country—Grea
Britain. Britain nevertheless provides
revealing comparison with the Unite
States, because its rate of urbanizatio
declined sharply after 1900, while th
American rate remained high.
more, it seems unlikely that any oth€
factors had strong differential effects 0:
thecurrency ratios of the two countrie5
The data underlying an estimate of th
currency ratio for Great Britain are sul
ject to considerable error, especially fc
the years before 1921, and the results c
this comparison, presented in Table
must be taken with extreme caution. Th
table lists as fully as the data allow th
periods of steady decline in the Unite
States ratio, thereby excluding Worl
Wars I and II and the 1930's. The
run movement of the British ratio is sim:
lar to that of the American ratio with fe'
exceptions. The former rose slightly dui
ing the period 1895—1903, though th:
rise could well reflect an error in the
ures. The American ratio reached ii
minimum in 1930, but the decline in tli
British ratio continued until 1936. (Dat
for 1921—36 are included in Table 2 f
8:omparison.) Both ratios rose during
Vorid Wars I and II and declined after-
yard. However, the British ratio started
.0 rise again after 1950.
For the period before World War II,
he British currency ratio declined, on
he average, about half as fast after 1900
i.s in the preceding two decades, and this
lower pace corresponds with a sharp
Irop in the rate of urbanization. In the
Jnited States, which had about as much
TABLE 2*
CoMPARIsoN OF CURRENCY RATIO WITH
URBANIZATION: GREAT BRITAIN
AND THE UNITED STATES
A. RURAL TO URBAN POPULATION MOVEMENTt
(PER CENT PER DECADE)











PERIOD Total Year Total Year
[883—88.. .—2.9 —0.6 —6.1 —1.2
1888—95... —4.1 —.6 —4.7 —0.7
1895—1903. +1.1+ .1 —3.3 —0.4
1903—14... —3.5 —.3 —6.3 —0.6
1921—30... —2.5 —.3 —4.3 —0.5
1921—36... —3.9 —.3
1945—50... —3.7 —.7 —3.7 —0.7
1950—55... +3.611+0.711 —1.6 —0.3
Sources: For Great Britain, Census1951England and Wales
eneral Tables (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1956), p. 3;
Lnd Census 1951 Scotland, III (Edinburgh: H.M. Stationery
)ffice, 1954), xxvii. For the United States, Statistical Abstract
p. 20.
The figures for Great Britain are for the second year of
decade; those for the United States are for the first year
each decade. The definitions of rural and urban areas for
England and Wales, Scotland, and the United States all differ.
Elowever, the figures give a fair approximation of rural-urban
novement over time for a wide range of applicable definitions.
t The increase in urban population in excess of the increase
:hat would have occurred if the ratio of urban to rural popula-
ion at the beginning of the period had remained constant,
iamely,
(
Uis number of persons living in urban places and R is
number of all others. The subscript i refers to the end of the
urbanization after 1900 as before, there
was also a reduction in the annual rate of
decline of the currency ratio, though it
was somewhat smaller than in Great
Britain. The decline after 1895 in the
United States was less than half as fast as
the decline from 1883 to 1888 but was
more than half as fast as the decline from
1888to1895. On the whole, there is only
a small difference between the behavior
of the ratios for these two countries, even
period and t —1to the beginning of the period.
If we express this number as a percentage of total popula-
tion at the beginning of the period and rearrange terms, we get
100
This formula was used to compute Part A of the table.
1861—91 at a decennial rate.
§ Great Britain: For 1914 and earlier years, currency in-
cludes estimates of total gold coin and bank notes issued (in-
cluding bank holdings) for Great Britain and Ireland (estimates
of silver coins were included for the period 1883—88 only) (see
Statistics for Great Britain, Germany, and France, 1867—1909
[Sen. Doc, 378 (61st Cong., 2d sess.)] [National Monetary Com-
mission, 19101) and E. Victor Morgan, Studies in British Fi-
nancial Policy, 1914—25 [London: Macmillan, 19321, p. 217).
The years shown are the only ones for which these estimates
are available. Deposits are estimates of total deposits with all
banks in Great Britain and Ireland (see René P. Higonnet,
"Bank Deposits in the United Kingdom, 1870—1914," Quarte,1y
Journal of Economics, LXXI (August, 19571, 330, Table I,
col. 1). These figures for currency and deposits are rough esti-
mates subject to considerable error. Moreover, they include
bank-vault cash, interbank deposits, and Treasury cash hnid-
ings. They are thus in error insofar as the ratio of currency to
deposits held by banks and the Treasury differs from that of
money held by the public. Only part of this error is avoided
by ignoring the level of the currency ratio and looking at its
change over time. Some rough estimates made to exclude bank
holdings suggest that the error from including them is not so
large as to destroy the usefulness of these figures for present
purposes. However, the deposit figures are reportedly too low
prior to 1890 because of incomplete coverage, so that the cur-
rency ratio is too high on that account prior to 1890; thus its
measured decline from 1888 to 1895 is probably too large.
For 1921 and later years, currency includes mid-year amounts
of notes and coins outside banks estimated by the research
office of the Bank of England (see Bank of Statistical
Summary, various monthly numbers beginning with May,
1932; revised figures for are given in Morgan, op. cit.,
Table 29 p. 224). This series was adjusted to exclude note
issues of banks in excess of their vault cash. Deposits refer
to the middle of the year. They are the sum of (a) public deposits
at the Bank of England; (b) deposits less float of the London
clearing banks (see Central Statistical Office, Annual Statistical
Abstract); (c) an interpolation of total deposits at a date near
the end of the year with Scottish joint-stock banks (see The
Banker's Almanac and Yearbook, section on "General Informa-
tion"); and (d) estimates of total deposits with private banks in
Great Britain and Ireland through 1937, after which they were
negligible (see Sir Walter T. Layton and Geoffrey Crowther,
An Introduction to the Study of Prices ILondon: Macmillan &
Co., Ltd., 1938J, appendix Table IV, p. 254). "Other accounts"
at the Bank of England, which are not shown separately from
interbank deposits before 1924, were excluded throughout; they
are relatively small, and their exclusion does not appear to be a
source of great error.
While all interbank deposits and float items have not been
eliminated, the figures have fairly complete coverage and, in the
main, appear to be reasonably accurate.
United States: Same as for Fig. 1.
I) Excluding Scottish banks, reports for which were un-
available for the latest years. They represent a small part of
the total, and their exclusion cannot affect the figures much.
9though their urbanization rates contrast
sharply.
By this evidence, urbanization works
to reduce the currency ratio slightly. Had
the United States been fully urbanized
by 1875, therefore, its ratio would prob-
ably have declined a little more slowly
than it did but certainly would have de-
clined nonetheless. Apparently the two
main effects of urbanization previously
discussed largely cancel out, so that the
net effect is fairly small. The unreliability
of the early data for Great Britain, how-
ever, makes this conclusion tentative and
makes further study of a wide range of
countries desirable.
6.RATE OPTAX ON TRANSACTIONS
The last variable to be considered is
the rate of tax on transactions. Some
people evade taxes by making as many
transactions as possible with currency
and not reporting them to the tax collec-
tor. In the absence of independent evi-
dence on transactions, such as canceled
bank checks, tax evasion is difficult to
detect. Obviously, evasion will occur on a
large scale only if the tax rate is high
enough to create sufficient incentive. The
most extensive tax on transactions with a
high rate is the income tax, and even here
the rates have become exceptionally high
only since the late 1930's. The nature of
many income payments makes their
transaction with currency highly imprac-
tical, so that the possibility of evasion by
use of currency is effectively limited to
the income of unincorporated businesses
and independent professional practice.
As for other taxes, most sales and excise
taxes have fairly low rates and are dif-
ficult to evade. The tax variable will be
discussed further in connection with war-
time increases in the currency ratio.
This completes the list of variables
that were examined for their contribu-
tion to long-run movements in the cu
rency ratio. The foregoing discussit
gave reasons for neglecting the effects
two—'the volume of retail trade and
travel—and for attaching only minor ir
portance to a third—urbanization. Th
leaves three variables—interest on d
posits, real income, and the tax on tran
actions—whose relative importance r
mains to be assessed. One way of doir
this is by a correlation of time-serif
data, which is reported later. Anothi
way, taken up in the next section, is by
detailed examination of the
movements in the currency ratio dunn
World Wars I and II. The wartime d
mand for currency may have been a
fected by special factors not present
other times, which need to be considere
in addition to the factors already di
cussed.
II. WARTIME INCREASES IN THE
DEMAND FOR CURRENCY
If we take the 1940 level of the cux
rency ratio as roughly "normal," cur
rency in circulation in 1945 was 8.1 pe
cent above normal, which implies tha
there was $10.1 billion "excess" currenc:
in that year. This excess cannot be at
tributed to changes in either interes
payments or real income; such change
were not pronounced during this perio
(see Fig. 2), and their effects tended t
offset each other. During World War
the increase in the ratio was less prc
nounced. If the 1914-47 level of the rati
is considered normal, currency in circula
tion was 3 per cent above normal in 191k
(The subsequent analysis largely ignore
the World War I period because
sary data on other factors are not avai
able.)
The excess wartime demand for cui
rency has attracted a great deal of atter
tion and is generally attributed to one (
10lye factors. Conceivably, all five could
iave contributed about equally to it.
yet, as will be shown, all but one of them
actually account for only a minor
raction of the total increase, and that
)ne—income tax evasion—could account
or nearly all of it. This variable, there-
ore, will be singled out as the probable
nain cause and will be discussed first.
rhe other proposed explanations, dis-
cussed afterward, are black markets,
travel, the size of the armed forces, and
change of residence.'5
1. EVASION OF TAXES
The use of currency to conceal taxable
transactions was probably higher during
and after the war, primarily because in-
come tax rates were raised substantially
early in World War II and have not been
appreciably reduced since. Income re-
ceived, held, and spent without prior
deposit in a bank usually defies detec-
tjOn.16 A tax on income thus leads some
people to receive income and make ex-
penditures as far as possible without the
use of checks. To be sure, incorporated
businesses and most wage and salary
earners have little or no such reason for
preferring payments in currency. The
15A sixth explanation—foreign demand for Unit-
ed States currency to hoard—has been unofficially
estimated by the Federal Reserve Division of Re-
search to account at most for about one-tenth of the
1940—45 increase in currency. This estimate suggests
that foreign demand had a relatively small effect on
the currency ratio and, for present purposes, can be
ignored.
Butnot always, as the following incident dra-
matically proves:
"Tax investigators recently closed in on a Dallas
area dentist who stashed $20,000 of unreported in-
come in a coffee can. He arrived home one day to
discover his wife had thrown the can into the trash.
After finding that neighborhood trash already had
been collected, he hired a bulldozer for $5,000 [sicl
and carefully sifted the city dump. By the time the
frantic dentist finally located the coffee can, the
whole town—as well as interested Government
agents—knew about its contents" (Wall Street Jour-
nal, April 11, 1957).
former undergo public audits, and most
of the latter have their income tax with-
held, a device that frustrates whatever
temptations to defraud the government
high tax rates may arouse. Even before
withholding was introduced early in the
war, most individuals who wished to be
paid in currency could not hope to
change the pay practices of their em-
ployers but had to seek out currency-
paying employments.Itisdoubtful
whether, at the low income tax rates pre-
vailing before the war, many companies
paid workers in currency solely to attract
would-be tax evaders and thus to be able
to pay lower wages. We may expect that,
if evasion of income taxes through the
use of currency were widespread,it
would occur primarily among small unin-
corporated businesses, including inde-
pendent professional practice.
How large, then, could the demand for
currency be from unincorporated busi-
nesses and professional practice alone?
One easy and revealing way of judging
the size of this demand is to compare an
estimate of unreported income based on
the quantity of excess currency circulat-
ing in 1945 with an independent estimate
of unreported business and wage income.
The currency ratio, excluding money
balances of incorporated businesses, was
15.5 per cent'7 in June, 1940, which can
be taken as roughly normal because in-
come tax rates were then relatively low.
(Because data on unincorporated busi-
nesses separately are unreliable, such
businesses are included with all individ-
uals.) This ratio implies normal currency
holdings in June, 1945, of $12.4 billion
for individuals and unincorporated busi-
11
Based on figures for ownership of liquid assets
(Federal Reserve Bulletin, June, 1948, p. 658, and
July, 1954, p. 710). These figures exclude mail float
from checking accounts, and this was added back
according to the proportionate holdings for each
group of demand deposits excluding the float.nesses. In that month this group actually
held $23.2 billion, an excess of $10.8 bil-
lion.18 If it is assumed that all, or almost
all, unreported income is transacted with
currency, it follows that $12.8 biffion was
the amount of money held against unre-
ported income.'9 What level of such in-
come does this figure imply? As a rough
approximation, we can multiply this esti-
mate by the ratio of annual personal dis-
posable income to total personal money
balances, excluding incorporated busi-
nesses. This ratio shows the quantity of
annual personal expenditures and sav-
ings normally handled by a dollar of
money. In 1945 this ratio was 1.66, which
would put unreported income at $12.8
billion times 1.66, or $21 billion. How-
ever, the real value of money balances
was unusually large in that year; appar-
ently many people had accumulated
money savings with the intention of pur-
chasing postwar consumer goods not
then available. Such savings should per-
haps be excluded from these calculations.
We may do so by using the ratio of per-
sonal disposable income to personal bal-
ances in a normal year. In 1940 it was
1.84, and in 1950, 1.96. These ratios esti-
Totalholdings for all groups were $25.3 billion,
as estimated in Friedman and Schwartz, op. cit.,
from which holdings of corporations were deducted
(Federal Reserve Bulletin, be. cii.).
10Thistakes account of the currency that would
ordinarily be used. Suppose that cash balances held
against unreported income are M, all of which is
currency. Thus M equals the $10.8 billion excess
currency plus the currency that would normally be
held against this income. One way to estimate the
latter is to estimate the "normal" currency ratio.
For 1945 we may take this to be 15.5 per cent, the
figure for all groups in 1940 except corporate busi-
ness, which is probably an overstatement for unin-
corporated businesses alone and so is biased unfavor-
ably for the hypothesis being tested. Then, 0.155M




mate unreported income in 1945 at
and $25 billion, respectively. Thus th
estimate of excess currency in circuiatioi
in 1945 implies that from $21 to $25 bil
lion of income was unreported.2°
A comparison of this range with a corn
parable, independent estimate of unre
ported income will give one indication
the wartime increase in currency that re
suited from tax evasion. While such an
estimate can be made only indirectly and
is obviously subject to considerable er-
ror, a very rough figure is available. It
puts unreported income for 1945 at about
$15 billion.2' Compared with the preced-
ing figures, this suggests that high in-
20 Thisrange is equivalent to from 50 to 60 per
cent of total non-corporate business income, in which
most non-reporting presumably occurs. (The de-
nominator of these percentages is the sum of the
following items as estimated by the Department of
Commerce: income of unincorporated enterprises,
farms, and professional practice; rental income of
persons; and income, including wages and salaries,
from personal services and from services to private
households. Except for the last item, these figures
exclude all wages and salaries. For some excluded
wages and salaries income taxes are not withheld at
the source, and the figures thus exclude some income
which may not be reported. In this respect these per-
centages are somewhat too high.)
21 Iam indebted to C. Harry Kahn for this esti-
mate and the following description of its derivation:
The estimate was obtained by adjusting the Com-
merce Department's personal income estimates to
comparability with the income concept used on tax
returns; namely, adjusted gross income (AGI). The
following items were subtracted from total AGI to
obtain an estimate of unreported income: (1) AGI
reported on taxable and non-taxable returns as tab-
ulated in Statistics of Income for 1945 and (2) an
estimate of the amount of AGI not reported because
it was below the $500 filing requirement for that
year. The resulting estimate of unreported AGI is
$17,537 million, which includes dividends and inter-
est. To eliminate the latter, Selma Goldsmith's esti-
mate of $2,612 million for unreported dividends and
interest (see Studies in Income and Wealth [National
Bureau of Economic Research), XIII, 302) was sub
tracted from $17,537 million, which gives $14,925
million. This figure is a residual and is therefor
subject to the errors in both of its derivatives. It i
obviously an indirect and crude estimate of unre
ported income.
12ome tax rates account for 60—70percent
f the wartime increase in currency.22
This evidence is admittedly circum-
tantial and for that reason unreliable.
'hree considerations underlie the impor-
ance that I nonetheless attach to this
actor.
First, the foregoing argument rests on
wo assumptions, both of which appear
.ighly plausible: (a) unreported business
ncome involves the use of currency al-
exclusively,23 and (b) the amount of
urrency so used per dollar of income is
tot less than the amount of money used
er dollar of all income. If these two as-
umptions are correct, the preceding esti-
nate of the effects of income tax evasion
n the currency ratio is not overstated.
these assumptions are not en-
:irely valid, but it is hard to believe that
hey are grossly inaccurate.
Second, it is likely that assumption b is
ar too conservative and that the amount
of currency held against a dollar of unre-
ported income is much greater, on the
average, than the amount of money held
against a dollar of regular income. Unre-
ported income produces an abnormal de-
mand for currency to hoard. The amount
of currency hoarded by the tax evader
reported in an earlier footnote does not
seem unnatural under those circum-
stances, though it is very large by or-
dinary standards. Such hoarding on a
wide scale would increase the use of cur-
rency enormously. For this reason it
These rates did not fall appreciably from war-
time levels during 1945—55, and the moderate de-
cline in the currency ratio iii the postwar period
must be attributed to other factors, such as the rise
in interest paid on deposits and in per capita real
income.
23Inthe case of retail stores and certain services
vhere receipts are mostly in the form of currency,
proprietor or worker who wished to evade income
taxes would make his expenditures with currency
and not first deposit his receipts in a bank, as is
isually done.
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seems plausible to attribute three-fourths
or even all of the wartime increase in the
demand for currency to income tax eva-
sion.
Finally, possible alternative explana-
tions, even when taken together, seem
unable to account for very much of the
increase, or at least not for as much as the




crease the demand for currency in order
to conceal transactions, were prevalent
when price controls were in effect during
and after World War II and to a lesser
extent during World War I. Black-mar-
ket operations in wholesale trade surely
involved the use of large denominations
of currency, say twenty-dollar bills and
over, because of the large transactions
required. Such operations can be dis-
missed as unimportant contributors to
the wartime increase in currency for the
following reason: Data on the denomina-
tion of the currency 1940—45 show that
the value of bills of twenty dollars and
over, not all of which by any means rep-
resented a demand arising from illegal
activities, rose from 49 to 60 per cent of
the total value of the currency.24 This
increase of 11 per cent of the currency
outside banks in 1945 amounted to $2.8
billion, about one-quarter of the $10 bil-
lion abnormal demand forcurrency.
Even this figure overstates the effect, as
will be shown in a moment.
Insofar as black marketing involved
24Fromthe Federal Reserve Bulletin. The corre-
sponding percentage for bills of fifty dollars and over
was roughly constant during 1940—45.
These figures cover currency in bank vaults as
well as in public circulation and so are not entirely
appropriate. But the denomination of currency in
banks is likely to reflect demands to be expected
from depositors' withdrawals and so to parallel the
denomination of currency in public circulation.evasion of income taxes—and much of it
probably did—its effect was taken into
account in the preceding subsection. Not
all wartime tax evasion reflected black
marketing, however, and the evidence on
denomination of currency is one check oii
the importance of black marketing in
wholesale trade as an independent factor.
While tax evasion might also have in-
volved some hoarding of large-denomina-
tionbills, most evasion probably in-
volved transactions of average size that
did not use large bills; thus the relatively
small size of the increase in the amount
of large bills does not mean that tax
evasion was unimportant.
Of course, black marketing at the re-
tail level would not use large denomina-
tions of currency, and it was reported to
be widely prevalent during the war, espe-
cially in food sales. But retail transac-
tions are typically made with currency in
any event, and therefore the retail black
market could not have produced a great
increase in the use of currency.
Beforedismissingthisfactor,we
should consider the evidence further, be-
cause the increased use of large bills dur-
ing the war was thought to be a glaring
indication of widespread black marketing
and tax evasion. In 1945 the Treasury
hoped to discourage these illegal prac-
tices by having banks report exchanges
involving substantial amounts of cur-
rency or large bills. In 1947 two laws
were proposed in Congress, though never
enacted, to exchange the currency out-
standing for a new one.25 The intention
was to wipe out hoards acquired through
illegal activities. It is not clear whether
the exchange would have had the in-
tended effect, but it might have if funds
5239 and H.J. Res. 315 (80th Cong., 2d
sess.); see James J. Quinn, "New Money for Old—
Hot or Cold?" in Commercial and Finincial Chron-
icle, November 27, 1947.
illegally acquired were held in large bith
which presumably could not be quicki
disposed of, and which would not hay
been redeemed for the new currency fo
fear of raising suspicion aboutthei
source.
It is extremely doubtful whether th
basic premise of these
the increased demand for large bills in
volved illegal transactions—was true
What the argument underlying thes
proposals overlooks is that a risei
prices tends to raise the average denomi
nation of the currency proportionately
Inflation increases the average dolla
amount of and so the aver
age payment uses larger bills than be
fore. Thus some part, perhaps all, of
increase in the use of large bills was dw
to the inflation. This is confirmed by th
following comparison.
The average denomination of the cur
rency, weighting the value of each de-
nomination by the number of bills oi
coins outstanding and excluding bills
over $1,000, increased by 84 per cent
from 1940 to 1945.26 This overstates the
desired increase by some undetermined
amount because of the wartime liinita-
tion on the production of coins: dollar
bills had to be substituted to some extent
for coins in currency holdings, which
raised the average denomination of cur-
rency in circulation. We may use the
average denomination of checks cleared
by Federal Reserve banks as a rough
measure of the average size of transac-
tions. The increase in the average de-
nomination of checks from 1940 to 1945
The number of one-cent and five-cent pieceE
outstanding is available, but the breakdown of sub-
sidiary silver had to be approximated from figures
on coinage (from Annual Report of the Director of
Mint). Estimates of the average denomination ol
coins outstanding derived by various methods are al.
roughly the same; the method used, therefore,
likely to be fairly accurate.
14vas 70 per cent.27 The increase in the
denomination of currency ex-
ceeds this figure by a relatively small
amount and perhaps would hardly ex-
ceed it at all if we were able to correct for
the limitation on coin production. Thus
there was little shift to the use of large
bills that cannot be attributed to the
concurrent inflation28 arid that could re-
flect instead increased demand arising
from black marketing.
3. TRAVEL
As already mentioned, the per capita
number of intercity passenger miles on
all forms of transportation seems an ac-
curate enough measure of travel, even
27 Calculatedfrom data on checkclearings (ex-
cluding UnitedStates governmentchecks) published
in the Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve Syslem.
28 The percentage increases in the average denom-
ination of currency and the average amount of
checks are much larger than the concurrent increase
in price indexes. For example, the implicit price in-
dex of the Department of Commerce for gross private
product increased by about 36 per cent from 1940
to 1945. This means either (1) that the average dol-
Jar amount per transaction for some reason rose more
than prices during the war, or (2) that some of the
price rise of about 30 per cent shown by the implicit
price index from 1945 to 1948 occurred, in effect, be-
fore 1945 but was not reflected in quoted prices and
so in the index until after the removal of price
controls.
The subsequent decline in the average denomi-
nation of transactions partially supports the first
possibility. The average denomination of checks fell
11 per cent from 1945 to 1953. That of currency fell
about 30 per cent in the same period, but about half
of this was probably due to the removal of restric-
tions on coin production. This evidence suggests that
the average denomination of transactions rose about
11 per cent more than prices during the war. An al-
ternative explanation, however,isthat average
prices actually paid declined 11 per cent after the
war following the disappearance of wartime scarci-
ties but that, because of price controls, the index of
quoted prices did not show this decline, just as it
may not have shown all the previous rise. Price con-
trols could have caused a discrepancy to develop be-
tween the actual and the measured price movements
by leading consumers to shift toward higher-priced
or lower-quality items or to countenance retail black
marketing.
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though itis not entirely appropriate.
This variable can be dismissed for pres-
ent purposes, because the volume of
travel declined during the early years of
World War II, owing to the sharp cur-
tailment of the use of automobiles, which
accounted for almost 90 per cent of total
intercity travel in 1940.29 The volume
was higher in 1941 than in 1945 but rose
appreciably in the early postwar years.
Only an increase in travel during the war
and a subsequent decline would account
for the behavior of the currency ratio.
4. THE SiZE OF THE ARMED FORCES
Servicemen lead an unsettled life in
which bank connections are usually of
little value. A man entering the armed
forces will increase his use of currency per
dollar of income, and a large rise in the
number of servicemen may produce a
substantial increase in the use of cur-
rency. This factor is not likely to be im-
portant, however, because new entrants
to the armed forces also experience a sub-
stantial reduction in money income. In
1945 the average payroll of the entire
armed forces was $1.77 billion a month
higher than in and only part of
this difference was paid in United States
currency or paid directly to servicemen.
To a large extent foreign currencies were
used overseas, and many servicemen had
a substantial part of their pay sent di-
rectly to dependents or invested in sav-
ings bonds. Let us nevertheless suppose
that the entire military payroll was paid
monthly in currency and held in that
form during each month until spent. As
for hoarding, it is unlikely that service-
men typically carried much more than a
The index of the per capita volume of travel for
the 1940's is as follows: 1940, 100; 1941, 111; 1942,
98; 1943, 93; 1944, 99; 1945, 108; 1946, 119; 1947,
116; 1948, 116; 1949, 122.
30 National Income Supplement (1954), p. 181.month's pay at any one time, and there
is no reason to believe that the accumu-
lated money savings that servicemen
kept back home with their families con-
tained a higher fraction of currency than
the savings of civilians. On these assump-
tions, then, pay in currency remained
with servicemen an average of about two
weeks after it was received and so in-
creased the amount in circulation by
only $0.9 billion, and this takes no ac-
count of the currency that servicemen
held when they were civilians. Even un—
der more extreme assumptions, the pos-
sibleincreaseincurrency from this
source seems negligible.31
5. CHANGES IN RESIDENCE
During World War II war industries
paid high wages and attracted workers
from peacetime employments; this shift
in employment often involved a change
in residence. In addition, many wives
tried to live near the places in the United
States where their soldier husbands were
stationed. Migrants undoubtedly found
the use of credit difficult until they be-
came better known and so temporarily
had to use more currency than before.
This increased use of currency must have
lasted from several months to a year or
more after each change of residence.
Many of the migrant war workers may
also have been people who previously
31Inan interesting recent work on the currency
ratio, Stephen L. McDonald finds a close correlation
during the period 1939—53 between the ratio of cur-
rency outside banks to demand deposits adjusted
and military pay as a percentage of personal income;
he attributes a large part of the wartime increase in
currency to this factor ("Some Factors Affecting the
Increased Relative Use of Currency since 1939,"
Journal of Finance, XI [September, 1956b 313—27).
The high correlation proves little, however, for many
other variables affecting the currency ratio rose dur-
ing the war and would be highly correlated with the
ratio. For the reason given in the text, I cannot be-
lieve that currency holdings of servicemen were
important.
had low incomes and made little use o
banking facilities; they would not im
mediately acquire the banking habi
upon receiving high wartime wages
While this last factor works in the sam
way as a redistribution of income, th
rise in the income of these people wa
associated with their change in residence
and the effects of the two are closely re
lated.
One way to measure such changes ir
residence is by changes in state popula
tions resulting solely from migration.32 I:
we add up the increase in civilian popula-
tion from migration of only those states
showing a gain, we find that 2.3 million
people moved between April 1, 1940, and
July 1, 1942, and 2.8 million between
July 1, 1942, and July 1, 1945. These to-
tals understate the number of civilians
changing residence, because intrastate
movements are excluded and people
leaving a state with net gains reduce the
reported number of newcomers. This un-
derstatement does not seem to be great,
however; most of the migrants took jobs
in newly expanded war industries, the
largest of which were concentrated in a
few states. They therefore moved across
state lines, primarily in one direction.
Indeed, these figures, by including all
members of a migrating family, probably
overstatethe movementofincome
earners.
What is the largest increase in cur-
rency that could conceivably result?
Gross average weekly earnings in manu-
facturing, which exceeded average week-
ly take-home pay, were $44.39 in
Let us make the extreme assumption
that the average migrant was paid as
much asthe average ofallfactory
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32 Bureauof the Census, Current Population Re-
ports (Ser. P-25, No. 72 [May, 1953}), Tables 5 and
6.
Statistical A bstracl (1956), p. 220.yorkers and that migrants used no credit
banking facilities for three years but
:ept their entire weekly pay in currency
or the full week between payments be-
ore spending it. The use of extra cur-
then amounts to oniy $124 million
$44.39 times 2.8 million). Even if all the
yorkers who migrated between April,
L940, and July, 1945, did not use banks
:hroughout the period, the rise in cur-
could have been, at most, $226
Tiillion ($44.39 times 5.1 million), a mi-
iute part of the $10 billion increase we
to explain.
It is possible, of course, that many mi-
also kept their accumulated say-
ngs in the form of currency. Savings ac-
:umulated before moving would prob-
thly not raise the currency ratio, for
there is no reason to believe that mi-
lowered the fraction of their ac-
:umulated money savings previously
Lield with banks, except perhaps tem-
porarily while actually traveling. How-
ever, if many migrants kept all their say-
[ngs from increased wartime earnings in
.urrency, such hoards would raise the
urrency ratio. But it is doubtful whether
riigrants hoarded much currency in view
f the attractive alternative available in
Jnited States savings bonds and of the
trong pressures put on workers to enlist
n payroll savings plans. The wide war-
ime participation in these plans34 attests
:0 their importance and creates serious
loubt that hoarding by migrants was a
najor source of increase in the currency
atio.
34After a steady rise during 1943, the number of
of firms offering payroll savings plans
eached 85 per cent of all employees of business and
ndustry by June, 1944. The average deduction from
•articipating workers' pay was 9—10 per cent, and
bout half the employees in non-agricultural em-
loyments participated (see Report of the Secretary
f the Treasury [19441, pp. 52—53).
III. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF
TIME-SERIES DATA
One way to test the foregoing findings
is by a correlation of time-series data.
Such a correlation was run for the period
1919—55, using the interest, income, and
income tax variables only. Other vari-
ables that may to some extent have been
important, urbanization in particular,
were disregarded. Urbanization corre-
lates highly with the income variable,
and the effects of the two cannot be dis-
entangled in a time-series correlation.
The income variable can serve as proxy
for urbanization as well. The other vari-
ables examined for their contribution to
the wartime increases in the currency
ratio would probably correlate highly
with the income tax variable and would,
if used, also create multicollinearity in
the regression. Since the income tax vari-
able seems by all odds the most impor-
tant for the wartime period, it alone was
used.
1. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA
Interestpaid on deposits.—Judging
from the behavior of the demand for
commodities, we might expect the most
important determinant of the demand
for currency relative to deposits to be the
cost of holding one in lieu of the other, or
the net rate of interest on deposits. The
data needed to construct a time series of
this variable are available. Since 1919
there are comprehensive annual figures
for member banks on interest paid on
time and demand deposits, and on serv-
ice charges on demand deposits. Since
1934 such data are available for all in-
sured commercial banks. These can be
used to represent all commercial banks.
Before 1919 the data for commercial
banks are too incomplete to be used with
any confidence, and the correlations are
therefore limited to the period 1919—55.
17Much better figures for mutual savings
banks are available back to 1875 and
before. However, a comparison of inter-
est payments by savings banks since
1919 with those paid on demand deposits
indicates that short-run fluctuations in
the two series do not correspond at all
closely; thus the rate on savings deposits
cannot serve as an estimate of the rate on
demand deposits for the earlier period.
The banks' rates are useful, how-
ever, in showing the general movement
of interest payments before 1919.
Statistics on interest paid on deposits,
as already noted, take no account of
losses suffered by depositors in banks
that become insolvent and so do not
measure the net rates that depositors as
a group expect to receive. In the past,
these losses 'were not inconsequential. In
twelve crisis years from 1865 to 1933, de-
positors suffered an average annual rate
of loss of three-fourths of 1 per cent,35
though in most other years the annual
rate was fairly low. Since the late 1930's
the great majority of banks have joined
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion, and the loss to depositors has been
negligible. Available data on the percent-
age of deposits lost through bank failures
show actual past losses rather than the
losses depositors expect in the near fu-
ture. Naturally, expectations cannot be
measured directly. Yet, since depositors
must normally rely on past experience in
forming their expectations, it seems rea-
sonable that some average of past rates
of loss, giving greater weight to rates
more recent in time, would approximate
the expected rate. An average using ex-
ponential weights has been employed
elsewhere with apparent success to esti-
mate the expected rate of change in
prices and to estimate expected income;36
Annual Report of FederalDepositInsurance
Corporation (1940),p.63.
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there is every reason to believe that
pectations are formed in a similar way i
the present instance. Of course, an
ment based on these other results is fl(
conclusive; the main test is with th
presentdata. Here an exponentiall
weighted average of past losses was use
to estimate expected losses through
For later years, when deposit insuranc
rapidly came into effect and actual loss
were negligible, expected losses were a
sumed to be zero. While zero is obviousl
too low a figure for the period immedi
ately following the introduction of dL
posit insurance, it is certainly more ai
curate than a figure based on the experi
ence of the previous years, and there i
no basis for selecting an intermediate fit,
ure. As will be shown shortly, these esti
mates give better results than use of th
current loss rate throughout. Whethe
the particular weighting pattern for th
period before 1934 is the most appropri
ate one need not concern us. Because th
magnitude of losses is small compare
with interest payments, the series de
rived for the expected net return on de
posits is little affected by the exact
of the weighting pattern.
The series is plotted in Figuri
2 (it is inverted because of its inverse re
lation to the currency ratio). Figure
also shows the currency ratio and tw
other series to be described presently
The series are plotted on
scales to bring out their percentage varia
tions.
Movements in the currency ratio an
those in expected net interest payment
correspond closely. In particular, thes
payments account for a large part of th
sharp rise in the ratio after 1930. Cor
relation coefficients computed betwee:
30See Friedman, op. cit., Part II; and M. Fried
man, A Theory of the Consumption Function
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I I I Ilogarithms of the two series show that
the interest series accounts for 79 per
cent of the total variation in the currency
ratio since 1919. With correction for cur-
rent losses only, instead of correction for
the weighted average of past losses, the
correlation is lower; that is, the estimated
expected net return gives better results
than the current net return.
Let us next see how much of the resid-
ual variance can be explained by the two
other variables—expected real income
per capita and the rate of tax on income.
These variables are shown in Figure 2;
the former is shown inverted because of
its inverse relation to the currency ratio.
Expected real income per capita.—This
variable is estimated from an average of
past levels of net national product in con-
stant prices, weighted by an exponential
curve that gives greater importance to
more recent levels and divided by the
population. It would have been more ap-
propriate to use national income than net
national product, but the latter series
had already been averaged by the ex-
ponential weights for another study and
was used because it was readily available.
In any event, the trends in the two series
are very similar. The averaging proce-
dure smooths out cyclical fluctuations in
the underlying data, which seems appro-
priate because the use of currency rela-
tive to deposits is likely not to be ad-
justed for variations in real income that
are not viewed as permanent. This meth-
od of deriving expected income has been
used successfully elsewhere to explain
aggregate consumption (see n. 36).
Rate of tax on inconie.—The use of cur-
rency to evade income taxes is measured
by the annual percentage of personal in-
come collected for income taxes. The use
of this series presumes that the amount
of tax evasion depends directly on the
rewards. An ideal measure would be the
20
marginal rate levied on the average leve
of income for which taxes are not with
held, permitting currency to be used
aid evasion. The measure used is no
ideal, since it gives the average rate pai'
on total personal income and exclude
evaded taxes, but it seems close enougi
for present purposes. The measure ig
nores other incentives to use currency fo
concealing illegal transactions that hay
varied appreciably in volume, such as thi
production and sale of alcoholic bever
ages during national prohibition. Also
there may be lags between the impositiol
of increased tax rates and attempts
evade them. The percentage of persona
income taxed (see Fig.2) reached
plateau in 1943, while the currency
continued to rise for another year, whicl
may reflect such a lag. The sharp rise ii
the currency ratio in 1918 (see Fig. 1
may likewise reflect the increase in in
come taxes as a percentage of persona
income from nearly zero in 1916 to abou
1.8 in 1917, suggesting that tax evasioi
lagged by about a year. No attempt ha
been made to take account of such lags
2. IAITLTIPLE CORRELATION OF THE
TIME-SERIES DATA
The three variables just discussed wer
used in a multiple correlation to explaii
annual variations in the currency
for the period 1919—55. The
regression function, with the
ratio and three independent variables ii
logarithmic form, accounts for 89 pe
cent of the variation in the ratio. In
two-variable regression of the currenc:
ratio on interest payments, mentione(
earlier, the latter accounted for 79 pe
cent of the variation in the ratio, so tha
the additional two variables account fo,
about half of the remaining 21 per cent o
the variation. Thus interest payment
were the main determinant of the ratio iihis period.37 In Figure 2, each independ-
at variable is plotted on a vertical scale
hat is proportional to the relative mag-
itude of its contribution to changes in
he currency ratio in the multiple regres-
ion. The combined contribution of the
hree variables is shown by the lighter
ne. Comparison of the actual and the
stimated ratio indicates that variations
:i the currency ratio during the war pen-
ds are largely accounted for by increases
a the personal income tax. It does not
ppear that any of the other variables
onsidered, which were discarded be-
auseofinsufficientimportance but
night have had some influence, would
xplain the differences between the ac-
ual and the estimated series for the cur-
ency ratio. The serial correlation dis-
dayed by these differences probably re-
Lects persistent errors in the data, the in-
adequacy of the logarithmic regression
unction, and perhaps cyclical factors not
epresented by the independent van-
Even if too much importance has been
L.ttributed to the income tax variable and
ome combination of the discarded van-
Lbles in fact accounted for a sizable part
the wartime increases in the currency
'atio,the estimated regressioncoeffi-
:ients for the interest and real-income
iariables are probably not greatly in er-
or. Time series for the discarded van-
Lbles would have a pattern much like
bat of the income tax variable, so that
be interest and real-income variables
vould still account for the same varia-
ions in the currency ratio. Only a minor
This is also brought out by the square of the
)artial correlation coefficients, which is the fraction
residual variance in the currency ratio explained
theaddition of a third independent variable to a
egression on the other two independent variables.
['he square of this coefficient for interest payments
s0.69; for expected real income per capita, 0.47; and
or the income tax variable, 0.43.
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qualificationof the results seems re-
quired. Since time series of the discarded
variables, unlike income taxes, might de-
cline after 1945, the interest and real-
income variables may account for less of
the decline in the currency ratio since
World War II than the regression at-
tributes to them. The future behavior of
the ratio will show to what extent this
qualification is called for.
3. ELASTICITIES OF DEMAND FOR CURRENCY
The variation in the currency ratio as-
sociated with each of the three variables
used in the regression does not neces-
sarily measure the magnitude of their in-
fluence. The amount of this association
depends partly on the relative extent to
which the variables happened to vary
during the period covered, The regres-
sion coefficients, on the other hand, show
the effect on the currency ratio of equal
percentage fluctuations in each variable.
These coefficients are given by the re-
gression function derived from the mul-
tiple correlation:
log=—0.21log X1 —1.16log X2
+ 0.22 log X3+a constant,
where C/M stands for the currency ratio
and X1, X2, and X3 stand for expected
net interest paid on deposits, expected
real income per capita, and the percent-
age of personal income taxed, respec-
tively. The logarithmic form of the func-
tion may not give the best possible fit,
but it was used because it allows us to
measure elasticities easily.38
All the coefficients have the appropri-
ate sign. Interest payments are negative-
ly related to the currency ratio, indicat-
ing a shift to deposits when these pay-
ments rise; expected real income per
38Thestandard deviations of the regression co-
efficients are 0.02, 0.21, and 0.04, respectively.capita is also negatively related, indicat-
ing that deposits are a superior asset to
currency and are held in greater propor-
tion as real income rises; the income tax
variable is positively related to the cur-
rency ratio, indicating that a higher tax
rate brings currency into greater use.
The percentage changes in the ratio cor-
responding to a 1 per cent increase in
each of the independent variables are
roughly —4-,—1,and +4-,respectively.
These numbers measure the elasticity
of demand for currency with respect to
the three variables in the special sense
that the quantity of money is held con-
stant along the demand curve, A differ-
ent elasticity would be obtained by using
some more general restriction, such as
constant total wealth. To derive the elas-
ticity under the latter restriction, we
should have to know how the demand for
money changed with variations in the in-
dependent variables for a given total
wealth. The present elasticity concept
seems appropriate for most purposes,
since the demand for currency is usually
discussed in the context of a given de-
mand for money.
From the point of view of commercial
banks, however, these numbers are not
entirely appropriate. Banks are inter-
ested in changes in the currency ratio as a
possible source of drain on their reserves
and therefore want to know what the
change in the demand for currency would
be if they were to keep the quantity of
deposits unchanged. A fall in the interest
rate on deposits, for example, both raises
the demand for currency and lowers the
demand for deposits, and the elasticity
estimated here measures only the first of
these two effects. To measure their com-
bination, we add the absolute values of
the effect on currency, d log C/d log
and the effect on deposits, d log D/d log
of a change in any one variable. The
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former quantity normally has a negativ
sign with respect to interest payments o
real income; so we reverse its sign t
make it positive. Adding the resuitin






For the income tax variable, the signs I
the preceding identity would be re
versed. Thus the elasticity of demand fo
currency (ignoring sign) with respect t
any variable, the quantity of deposit
held constant, can be found by raising b
the factor MiD the absolute value of th
corresponding elasticity with the quan
tity of money held constant. The rang
of this factor over the period since
was from 1.52 in 1878 to 1.08 in 1930
With deposits unchanged, the
with respect to interest payments (ignor
ing sign), therefore, ranged from 0.23 t
0.32, which is quite low, though consider
ably above zero. The elasticity with re
spect to income taxes had thesame rang
Another way to arrive at this result is to deriv
the demand elasticity for currency with respect t
anyvariable under the restriction that the









(d logC'\=dlog (C/M) (M
log Xi)dD=o''d log
With respect to the income tax variable, the signs o
both sides are positive, and with respect to the othe
two variables, they are negative.in absolute value. For expected real in-
come per capita, the corresponding elas-
ticity (ignoring sign) ranged from 1.25 to
1.76, well above unity.
IV. VALIDITY OF THE STATISTICAL RE-
SULTS FOR THE EARLIER PERIOD
The foregoing analysis indicates that
the main determinants of the currency
ratio since 1919 are summarized by re-
gression function (1). Let us see whether
these findings are consistent with the
evidence for the period before 1919.
While an analysis of this early period is
difficult because of the lack of reliable
data on all the variables, the steady de-
cline in the currency ratio greatly sim-
plifies the problem: we can ignore the
minor short-run movements in the ratio
and deal only with its long-run rate of
decline. A logarithmic function fitted by
eye to the ratio for the period 1875—19 19
has a slope between —2.6 and —2.7 per
cent per year (compounded continu-
ously). The trend selected depends to
some extent on the interpretation given
to the rise in the ratio from 1875 to 1878.
Varying fractions of this rise were dis-
regarded in calculating the range for the
slope just given, for reasons to be dis-
cussed in a moment.
The next step is to compute trends for
net interest paid on deposits and ex-
pected real income per capita in this pe-
riod, to see whether these trends, on the
basis of the regression coefficients for the
later period, will explain the trend in the
currency ratio. (There was no personal
income tax during most of the early pe-
riod.)
The difficulty of this task is lessened
by the relatively small changes in inter-
est paid on deposits from the 1880's
through the 1920's. The evidence is mea-
ger and not entirely reliable, but most of
it suggests that these rates stayed within
a rather narrow range, except for a sharp
fall from the mid-1870's to the early
1880's. This fall is associated with the
major decline in short-term commercial
rates in 1874 that followed the financial
panic of 1873. If we can rely on the lim-
ited data available for that period, the
fall in rates on deposits was approxi-
mately 30 per cent. Thereafter, there ap-
pears to have been a slight further decline
in these rates from about 1889 to 1900
and a rise of similar size from 1900 to
1916. The data suggest that the size of
this fall and the subsequent rise is rough-
ly 15—2Q per cent. There is no need to
take account of losses on deposits in this
period, since, except during occasional
crises, they were relatively small.
The decline in interest rates beginning
in the mid-1870's seems to explain part of
the rise in the currency ratio from 1875
to 1878 (see Fig. 1). If we accept the esti-
mate of 30 per cent for the size of this
decline, an interest elasticity of —-i-im-
plies a 6 per cent rise in the currency
ratio, which is about half its actual rise
from 1875 to 1878. Part of the other half
may be attributed to the aftereffects of
the 1873 panic, which undoubtedly led to
increased losses on deposits and tem-
porarily made currency much safer to
hold.4° Consequently, I ignored half to
three-fourths of this rise in calculating
the long-run trend of the ratio.
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40 Suspensionsof state (though not of national)
banks rose moderately in 1873—76 and sharply in
1877—78. The annual number of suspensions in the
latter two years was three times greater than in the
years immediately following (see Hislorical
tics [ser. N135—138]).
Passage of the Bland-Allison Silver-Coinage Act
in February, 1878, might have created fears of in-
flation and of the failure of resumption scheduled for
1879. If it had, the public might have substituted
gold coin for other money, thus raising the currency
ratio. Gold coin in the hands of the public rose by
roughly $20 million from 1878 to 1879, but this is too
little to help in explaining much of the rise in the
currency ratio.The apparent decline in interest rates
from 1889 to 1900 and the subsequent
rise thereafter until 1916 appear to be
quite small, and consequently the effect
of these changes is difficult to judge. As-
suming that the previous estimate of
their size (15—20 per cent) is correct and
applying an elasticity of one-fifth, we
get, at most, a rise and fall of 4 per cent
(or about half of a percentage point) in the
currency ratio. Such variations would
partly explain why the rate of decline in
the ratio in the fifteen years following
1900 was more rapid than before. But the
amplitude of these variations is
and the evidence is too slim to warrant
any firm conclusions.
Taking the period from 1875 to 1919 as
a whole and neglecting deviations from
trend, we can calculate whether the
growth in expected real income per capita
can account for the average decline in the
ratio of 2.6 to 2.7 per cent per year, since
interest-rate changes apparently cannot.
The expected income series rises, on the
average, about 2.0 per cent per year
(compounded continuously) during this
period. The two trends thus imply an in-
come elasticity for the currency ratio be-
tweeri —1.3 and —1.4. Siucethe elastic-
ity computed from the regression for the
later period was —1.16with a standard
error of 0.21, the two elasticities are well
within the range to be expected from
random variation in the estimates. The
effect of growth in. income alone, there-
fore, as judged by its size in the later pe-
riod, was sufficient to have caused the
observed long-run decline in the currency
ratio in the early period.4' This effect, as
noted earlier, probably incorporates any
effects of a shift in the distribution of
income.
This comparison of trends leaves open
the possibility that a small part of the
long-run decline in the ratio may have
been due to other factors. Random
tions may have made the regression
ficient of the real-income variable
large. In addition, as noted in the las
section, this variable may account
less of the decline in the currency rati(
since World War II than was attribute
to it and so have a lower true coefficien
than is indicated by the regression. If so
changes in real income cannot accoun
for the entire decline in the currenc'
ratio in the early period. TJrbanization
41Thereis one piece of evidence on interest rate
that suggests somewhat different conclusions. I
1870 the comptroller of the currency made a surve
of the interest payments of all national banks. Hi
findings impiy that the average rate of interest pai
on all deposits of these banks was 1 per cent pe
annum. The average rate paid in the 1920's by mem
ber banks was about 2.25 per cent. There is no mdi
cation that national or member banks had much dif
ferent rates in the preceding decade. On the basis o
this evidence the rate rose from 1870 to World Wa
I by one and a quarter times.
There are several reasons for questioning th
relevance of this rise for present purposes. Th
comptroller gave no details on his survey, so that iL
accuracy and even the exact definition of the data
he reported are unknown. Furthermore, it is con-
ceivable that banks gave services in those days
(made non-pecuniary interest payments) that are
no longer offered (it is difficult to form an accurate
picture of banking practices so many years ago).
Finally, a rate of 1 per cent for national banks is sc
far out of line with the rates paid by mutual savings
banks in New York State and Massachusetts at
same time, as judged by the differential in latez
periods, that one feels compelled to question its corn
parability with the later data.
Let us nonetheless suppose that it is correct.
residual effect of real income can be readily calcu-
lated: With an elasticity of one-fifth, a rise in th
interest rate from 1 to 2.25 per cent would account
for 25 per cent of the decline in the currency ratic
up to World War I. Since the downward slope in
ratio was 2.6—2.7 per cent per year and since 25 pei
cent of this may have been due to the intereSt-rate
rise, about a 2.0 per cent per year decline can b
attributed to real income. Real income rose at a rate
of 2.0 per cent per year, so that the elasticity of
effect on the ratio might have been only —1.0 in.
stead of —1.3 to —1.4, as reported in the text.
is much closer to the estimate of the elasticity foi
the period 1919—55 arid gives stronger evidence
the entire decline in the ratio up to World War I car
be attributed to the growth in real income.
24those effects were found to be minor but
robably not negligible, may therefore
ccount for a small part of the decline in
he ratio. Possibly, too, a slight growth
)f banking in excess of the long-run ef-
ects of rising real income resulted in part
rom a gradual adoption of checking fa-
ilities until 1900 or later, for a variety of
easons connected with the nation's corn-
nercial growth and geographical expan-
ion.42 This isthe usual explanation
;iven in historical discussions of banking.
'Vhile it cannot be tested, it seems plau-
ible enough. But it appears to be far
ess important than many have thought.
This conclusion is not invalidated by
he objection that the effects of general
factors were included in the effect
.scribed to the rise in real income. The
ize of the effect of a rise in real income
vas estimated from data for the later
period, by which time the importance of
aspects of growth had certainly di-
minished greatly. The income effect was
nevertheless large enough to account for
substantially all the decline in the cur-
rency ratio in the early period, when. the
other factors contributing to the growth
of banking were, from all indications, the
strongest.
V. STTh{MARY
The ratio of currency to the total
money supply has fluctuated consider-
ably since 1875, and no one variable can
account for all its movements. While
many variables could affect the currency
ratio, only three seem to have played a
major role. In terms of the usual demand
analysis, a price and an income variable
—the expected net rate of interest paid
on deposits and expected real income per
capita—have been major determinants
of the demand for currency relative to
deposits. These two variables cannot ex-
plain exceptional wartime increases in
the currency ratio, however, and various
other possible causes of these increases
were considered. Only attempts to con-
ceal income payments in order to evade
high tax rates seem capable of creating
enough additional demand for currency
to account for the wartime increases.
This finding, however, rests on indirect
evidence and is tentative.
For the period 1919—55 a multiple re-
gression of the currency ratio on the ex-
pected net rate of interest on deposits,
expected real income per capita, and in-
come taxes as a percentage of personal
income yielded estimates of the elasticity
of demand for currency with respect to
these three variables. These estimates
were found to be consistent with the data
for the period from 1875 to World War I.
In this period the rise in expected real in-
come per capita accounted for most or all
of a steady decline in the currency ratio.
The analysis can be summarized by
hazarding a prediction of the probable
future course of the currency ratio. As-
suming no change of consumer habits in
the use of currency, we may expect the
ratio to decline proportionately with the
growth in real income per capita. Any in-
crease in the interest rate paid on depos-
its or any reduction in the personal in-
come tax would hasten the decline. Thus.
with no change in reserve requirements,
commercial banks can look forward to a
long-run expansion of their deposit lia-
bilities in excess of the growth in Federal
These perhaps include a growin.g familiarity
with banking (related partly, no doubt, to the in-
crease in white-collar employment) and an increas-
ing fraction of total payments made through the
mails between persons in separate parts of the
country.
These factors pertain to the demand side. I know
of no factors on the supply side that would produce
a gradual growth of banking; presumably at any
point in the nation's development, except perhaps
for short periods of adjustment, the public could
have had as many banking facilities as it was willing
to pay for.
25Reserve credit and Treasury currency.
This expansion will reflect a decline in the
currency ratio like that which occurred
until 1930 and was subsequently inter-
rupted, first by a fall in net interest rates
paid on deposits during 'the depression
and then by an increase in the personal
incometaxduring World War II
Whether this decline in the ratio wil
continue much further or whether then
is some level considerably above zer
that marks the minimum extent to whici
deposits can be substituted for currency,
the future course of the ratio will tell.
APPENDIX
DATA AND SOURCES
1. RATIO OF CURRENCY TO THE
TOTAL MONEY SUPPLY
The annual figures shown in Figure 1 are
for August, 1875—81, and June, 1882—1955.
It would have been appropriate to use an
annual average of monthly ratios for the
multiple correlation reported in the text,
since all the other variables refer to full
years. However, such an average would have
differed little from these mid-year ratios.
The numerator of the ratio is total cur-
rency outside banks and the Treasury. The
denominator equals the numerator plus time
and demand deposits with commercial banks
held by the non-banking public. Traveler's
checks of banks, which are a form of cur-
rency, are included with deposits in the
basic data and cannot be separated. They
are known to be small in amount, however,
and cannot affect the figures appreciably.
Deposits with mutual savings banks and the
Postal Savings System, which are sometimes
included in the money supply, were ex-
For some evidence suggesting that they are not
close substitutes for commercial bank deposits and
a detailed explanation of the money figures, see
Friedman and Schwartz, op. cit.
cluded.43 In any event, the major move-
ments in the currency ratio are not sig-
nificantly altered by including them.
2. EXPECTED NET RATE OF RETURN
ON DEPOSITS
For 1919—55, this series is shown in col-
umn 5 of Table A and equals the rate of re-
turn on deposits in column 1 minus the ex-
pected rate of loss on deposits in column 3.
Earlier figures are presented in Tables B and
C.
The rate of return on deposits is based on
the rates of interest paid (less any charges
received) by member or insured commercial
banks on time and demand deposits. Since
1927, separate rates for time and demand
deposits can be derived. For each year a
weighted average of these rates was taken,
using weights based on the distribution of the
two kinds of deposits in all commercial banks
on June 30. For 1919—26 no breakdown of rates
on time and demand deposits is available,
and an average rate paid by member banks
on all deposits was used. The member-bank
26TABLE A
DETERMINANTS OF THE CURRENCY RATIO, 1919-55
(1) (5) (6) (7)
.919 2.06 2.04 561 2.23
920 2.10 2.06 564 1.87
921 2.23 2.13 533 1.60
1922 2.26 2.17 557 1.75
1.923 2.24 2.13 584 1.20
1924 2.25 2.11 602 1.23
1925 2.22 2.08 618 1.23
1926 2.23 2.08 642 1.26
1927 2.24 2.09 657 1.20
1928 2.31 2.18' 668 1.28
1929 2.30 2.16 688 1.61
1930 2.26 2.01 672 1.56
1931 .92 1.46 643 0.98
1932 .73 1.27 388 0.77
933 0.39 545 0.94
934 0.95 0.95 331 1.01
935 0.68 0.68 548 1.16
936 0.51 0.51 583 1.32
937 0.47 0.47 624 2.06
1938 0.44 0.44 632 2.12
1939 0.36 0.36 653 .47
1940 0.28 ' 0.28 687 .61
1941 0.21 .... .... 0.21 737
1942 0.16 .... .... .... 0.16 774 3.52
1943 0.09 .... .... .... 0,09 803 10.7
1944 0.10 .... .... .... 0. 0 828 10.6
1945 0.13 .... .... .... 0. 3 852 11.8
1946 0.14 .... .... .... 0.14 873 10.3
1947 0.14 .... .... .... 0.14 875 11.0
1948 0.13 .... .... .... 0.13 880 9.77
1949 0.12 .... .... .... 0.12 866 8.93
1950 0.12 .... .... .... 0.12 893 8.78
1931 0.13 .... .... .... 0.13 914 11.0
1952 0.16 .... .... .... 0.16 927 12.3
1953 0.19 .... .... .... 0.19 942 12.2
1954 0.21 .... .... .... 0.21 945 11.2
1935 0.22 .... .... .... 0.22 970 11.3
Negligible after 1933. In computing cols. 3 and 4, the following percentage rates of loss were used f or earlier periods:1915—18,
0.02; 1901—14, 0.05.
t Assumed to be zero after 1933.
rate is slightly below the rate derived for all
commercial banks, primarily because time
deposits, which pay higher rates than de-
mand deposits, are more important relative
to demand deposits in non-member than in
member banks. The figures for 1919—26 were
therefore raised by 0.19 percentage points,
which is the average difference between the
two series for 192 7—30.
The various rates of interest used were
found by dividing the appropriate average
27
quantity of deposits into the amount of in-
terest payments (lessservicecharges) as re-
ported in aggregate earnings statements.
For 1942—55 earnings statements are avail-
able for all insured commercial banks.44 For
1934—41 these banks did not report service
charges on demand deposits as a separate
item but did show interest paid on time de-
posits. For the other rates, statements of all



















































0.91member banks were used45 to derive rates on
demand deposits, 1927—41; on time deposits,
1927—33; and, as already noted, on all de-
posits combined, 1919—26. Member-bank
rates for demand and time deposits before
1942 were adjusted to the level of the cor-
responding later rates covering all insured
commercial banks, using the difference be-
tween overlapping segments. This adjust-
ment was similar to the adjustment for
1919—26 described in the preceding para-
graph. The adjustment was small, indicating
that the average rates for member banks
were not altered much by including non-
member insured banks. The adjustment was
nonetheless necessary to prevent a break
where the two segments of the series were
joined.
The denominator used for the rates was a
weighted average of June and adjacent De-
cember figures for deposits; it was selected
to correspond to the quantity on which in-
terest was paid or service charges were im-
posed. For time deposits, this quantity was
the total amount outstanding. For demand
deposits, this quantity was individual de-
mand deposits since mid-1933 (when inter-
est on United States government deposits
was discontinued), individual plus United
States government demand deposits for
1927 to mid-1933, and all demand deposits
for 1919—26.Interestpaid on interbank de-
mand deposits was reported separately after
1926 and was excluded from the numerator
of the ratio for all later years. Cashier's and
officer's checks were excluded from demand
deposits in these computations, on the pre-
sumption that fees from these services are
combined with other items in the earnings
statement. There are no figures for estimat-
ing the average fee received per dollar of
such checks outstanding, and this item was
Banking and Momelary Statistics, pp. 262—63;
and Federal Reserve Bulletin. Before 1933 these state-
ments do not give charges on demand accounts sepa-
rately, and gross payments on these accounts there-
fore had to be used, but it can be presumed that such
charges were relatively small. In any event, any
service charges before 1933 could be imposed simply
by paying a lower rate of interest and presumably
were.
neglected altogether. It is not clear wheth
or not most of these checks act as a subst
tute for currency in much the same way
demand deposits do and whether, for oi
purposes, fees for them should be counted
a charge on deposits. Since the quantity
these checks is relatively small, fees
them, however treated, would have ne
ligible effects.
The expected rate of loss on deposits is
weighted average of past rates of loss. Th
two alternative weighted averages shown i
Table A give substantially the same result
The one in column 3 was used to derive th
expected net rate of return shown in colum
5. The series in column 3 is based on ex
ponential weights. As explained in the tex
these are the same weights as those use
elsewhere to derive expected income fror
actual income. The alternative series in col
umn 4 is based on the arbitrary
that expected losses are determined by ac
tual average losses over the preceding fly
years;the weights of the years decline by
equal amount each year going backward 1:
time. In comparison, the exponential pat
tern puts only 87 per cent of its weight ox
the first five years. Both weighted
are dated as of the end of each year but weri
assumed to apply to the entire year. It wa
further assumed that expected losses im
mediately fell to zero after 1933 because de
posit insurance was instituted on January 1
1934.
28
These estimates of expected losses are no
the best that can possibly be derived, what
ever the criterion proposed. However,i
seems appropriate to take account of pas
events in these estimates, and th.e
methods of doing so, which give almost iden
ticalresults, are simple and reasonable
Thus both methods should give a mud
closer approximation to expected losses thai
the use of annual losses themselves withou
any weighting of past values.
The data on actual losses borne by corn
mercial bank depositors were based o
FDIC estimates.46 The FDIC also publishe
average deposits for the appropriate periodE
46Annuai Report (1940), pp. 66 and 69.rom which losses per dollar of deposits can
e computed. These estimates of losses ex-
lude all amounts eventually recovered by
epositors. Actual losses after 1933 were neg-
igible, owing partly to the institution of
Leposit insurance.
The published estimates of losses cover
years since 1920 and certain over-
ipping segments of the preceding years.
)nly an average rate is given for the periods
TABLE B
RATE OF INTEREST PAID BY COM-
MERCIAL BANKS FOR VARI-
OUS YEARS, 1889_1912*
(PerCent per Year)
1915—19and 1901—20. Inthe weighted aver-
age of loss rates, the average rate for 1915—
19 was assumed to apply to each of the
years it covers. A rate was estimated for
1920 by interpolating between rates for ad-
jacent years on the basis of the number of
bank failures.47 The rate so derived for 1920
and the published rate for 1915—19 were
used to compute a figure for total losses for
1915—20. This in turn was deducted from the
total given for 1901—20 to derive an average
rate for 1901—14 that was used for each year
of the period. The derived series of rates is
shown in column 2 of Table A. Of course, the
Banking and Monetary Statistics, p. 283.
rates applied to individual years before 1920
are only approximate, but they are quite
satisfactory for deriving the weighted aver-
ages because the weighting patterns attach
less importance to rates more distant in
time and thereby reduce considerably the
effects of any errors in the earlier rates.
Tables B and C list the comparable rates
readily available on interest payments be-
fore 1919.48 The rates in Table B, which
covercommercialbanks, were taken from
the Annual Report of the Comptroller of the
Currency. The rates before 1900comefrom a
survey made by the comptroller in 1899 for
selected years back to All rates in
Table B are for deposits not payable on de-
mand, so far as their classification can be
determined. However, the type of deposits
coveredby the data for 1889—99 and for
1.9 12 is not specified, andtheymay be an
averagethat includes some or all demand
depositsas well.
In the 1870 AnnualReport (p.xii) the
comptrollergives figures on interest paid by
all national banks for the year. From this an
averagerate of 1 percent paid on all deposits
withthese banks can be derived, as reported
in note 41. This is much lower than the rates
inTable Cfor later years, presumably be-
cause it covers demand as well as other de-
posits, while those in the table apparently
covertime and savings deposits only. Be-
causeof this and other possible incompara-
bilities, the 1870 rate was excludedfromthe
table.
Withthis one exception, there are data
only for mutual savings banks for the years
Available figures covering state commercial
banks in Kansas beginning with 1902 are not shown
(see "Trends in Rates of Bank Earnings and Ex-
penses," Federal Reserve Bulletin [1938], pp. 102—26,
Appendix Table XII). These data point to a dou-
bling in the interest rate on deposits from 1902 to
1914. This rise is much larger than that indicated by
the rates for 1899 and 1912 in Table B and would
largely explain a rate of decline in the currency ratio
during that period more rapid than that indicated by
the logarithmic trend line fitted to the whole period
since 1875. It would be hazardous to draw any con-
clusions from these data, however, because of their
limited coverage.









* Unlessotherwise indicated, rates are for
"other" deposits (presumably only time de-
posits, though possibly also some or
all demand deposits) as opposed to 'savings"
deposits. The distinction refers to the period of
noticerequiredforwithdrawals.J-Iowever,
there is little difference between rates on time
savings deposits in years when both are re-
ported separately by commercial banks.
t For time deposits only. The rate reported
for demand deposits is 2.4 per cent.
For time deposits of state commercial
banks only. The rate reported for demand de-
posits is 2.6 per cent. For private banks, the
reported rates are 3.9 per cent for time deposits
and 2.9percent for demand deposits.
§ Not available.
II For state commercial banks only. The re-
ported rate for private banks is 3.8 per cent.
29before 1889. These are shown in Table C be-
ginning with 1870 and extended, in order to
give comparable figures for a long period,
through 1916. Several states have reports of
mutual savings banks covering years before
1889, but only for New York and Massachu-
setts are the relevant data aggregated.5° The
rates in Table C are based on these data.
The rates shown for the years 1889 and
1894—1916 cover all reporting mutual sav-
ings banks in the United States (including
reporting stock savings banks before 1909)
and are from the comptroller's Annual Re-
porl.
The avai1able data on rates paid by com-
mercial banks indicate a decline of one-sixth
from 1889 to 1899; after that they are
unclear. While the rates appear to be high in
1910, they are down to 1899 levels in 1911—
12; such short-term movements obscure the
trend of the rates from 1899 to 1912. The
series for mutual savings banks indicate a
sharp decline in interest rates paid, starting
about 1875 and ending about 1880, and a
slight further decline from 1889 to 1900 that
was retraced by 1916. The decline from 1875
to 1880 was about 30 per cent.
The behavior of short-term commercial
interest rates tends to confirm the move-
ments in rates paid by mutual savings
banks. After 1874 commercial rates fluctu-
ated widely but do not exhibit the well-
known long-run movements shown by bond
yields. The trend of commercial rates is
roughly horizontal from 1876 to 1891, slight-
ly downward from 1891 to 1899, upward
from 1899 to 1907, and downward again
from 1907 to These movements are
similar to those in payments by mutual sav-
ings banks, except for the last segment, and
See New York State, Report of the Superin-
lendent of the Banking Department Relative to Savings
Banks and Trust Companies (1891), pp.10and 11;
and Massachusetts, Annual Report of the Board oJ
Commissioners of Savings Banks (1876), and subse-
quent volumes.
See Frederick R. Macaulay, Some Theoretical
Problems Suggested by the Movements of Interest Rates,
Bond Yields and Stock Prices in the United States
since 1865 (National Bureau of Economic Research,
1938), Chart 20, p. 217.
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even this could perhaps be interpreted
having a horizontal trend with large cyclic
dips in 1908 and 1915.
The unanimity of the evidence on shor
term rates for the early period suggests
TABLE C
RATEOF INTERESTPAID BY MUTUAL SAVINGS
BANKS, 1870—89AND1894—1916
(Per Cent per Year)
New York Massa- United
YearState*chusettsf Year States
1870. ...5.5 ... § 1889... 4.0
1871....5.4 ..
1872....5.7 ... § 1894... 3.7
1873....5.5 .. 1895... 4.0
1874. ...5.4 ... § 1896... 4.0
1875....5.2 6.2 1897... 3.7
1876....4.7 5.7 i.898... 4.0
1877....4.3 5.0 1899... 3.4
1878....4.4 4.1 1900... 3.5
1879....4.1 3.7 1901... 3.5
1880....3.7 3.9 1902,.. 3.5
1881....3.5 4.0 1903... 3.5
1882....3.5 4.0 1904...3.5
1883....3.5 4.1 1905... 3.6
1884....3.44.2 1906... 3.5
1885....3.4 4.1 1907... 3.6
1886....3.4 4.1 1908... 3.6
1887....3.4 4.1 1909... 3.8
1888....3.4 4.1 1910... 3.9






* Interestpaid during the calendar year divided by an
average of deposits at the beginning and the end of the year.
This sertes can be extended beyond 1889 and back to 1860. Be-
tween 1860 and 1869 the rates varied from 4.4 per Cent in 1861
to 5.7 per cent in 1869.
t Reported average dividend on deposits for year ending
October 31. This series can be extended beyond 1889. The only
rate reported for years before 1875 is one of 4.8 per cent for 1865
(see Report of/he Superinfrndent, [18761, p. 371). For a Summary
of data for 1892 to 1906 see the report for 1906, I, viii.
Rates through 1908 are those of reporting mutual and
stock savings banks and thereafter of mutual savings bank,
only.
§ Not available.
fl Indicated in source to be slightly too high.
interest rates on commercial bank deposits
followedthesamegeneralmovements,
though certainly with much less amplitude.
A comparison of interest rates on deposits in
mutual savings banks and in commercia]
banks since 1919 indicates that, although
short-run variations in the two rates ar€
likely to differ, the large variations reflecting
long-run movements appear to
This agreement is reasonable, since interesiayments depend on the return from earn-
ig assets, all of which in the long run have
ields that move roughly together. It seems
therefore, to assume that the decline
om .1875 to 1880 and the following small
ecline and rise in interest paid by mutual
a.vings banks correspond to similar move-
ients in interest paid by commercial banks.
3. EXPECTED REAL INCOME PER CAPITA
This series, shown in column 6 of Table A
or 1919—55, is an exponentially weighted
verage of annual figures for real net na-
ional product in 1929 prices,52 divided by
he mid-year population residing in con-
mental United States. The movements in
national product do not differ appre-
iably from those in national income except
luring wartime, and for these years the
)riginal series was replaced by an extrapola-
ion of its prewar trend. The series for net
iational product, therefore, can be used to
•epresent national income with sufficient ac-
:uracy for present purposes. No other esti-
nate of expected real income of this kind
the entire period 1919—55 was
tvailable when the regression reported in the
:ext was computed, and it seemed unneces-
;ary to compute one specially for this study.
The weighting pattern used was the same
ts that developed elsewhere, as explained in
the text, except that no adjustment was
nade for an expected upward trend. As a
the series is slightly lower than it
would be if adjusted for expected trend.
Elowever, this downward bias has no effect
)fl relative changes in the series and, there-
Fore, on the regression coefficients.
References in the text to the trend of ex-
Dected real income per capita before 1919
refer to the trend of the series on expected
real income described above minus the
trend of population in continental United
states as reported in decennial censuses.
4. PERCENTAGE OP PERSONAL INCOME TAXED
This series, shown in column 7 of Table A
For 1919—55, is the ratio of personal income
b2Describedand used by Friedman and Schwartz,
taxes to personal income for each calendar
year.
The numerator is the sum of federal,
state, and local income taxes. For 1929—55,
Department of Commerce figures were used.
These figures include the amount of refunds,
which, although small, should, but cannot,
be excluded. For 1925—28, collections of fed-
eral income taxes53 for calendar years were
used. Before 1925 these collections were re-
ported together with those from corporate
income taxes and could not be separated.
Hence federal personal income tax liabili-
ties54 were used, instead, for 1919—24. For
the years after 1924, actual collections gen-
erally exceeded these liabilities. For 1919—
24, therefore, the liabilities were increased
by 18 per cent to give a corrected estimate
of collections; this percentage is the relative
amount by which collections exceeded lia-
bilities in 1925. Earlier figures used for the
state and local income tax were collections
as compiled for 1925—31 by Roy G. Blakey55
and as estimated for 1919—24 by C. Harry
Kahn.56
Department of Commerce estimates of
total personal income were used in the de-
nominator of the ratio. For 1929—55 they are
official estimates published in the National
Income Supplement to the Survey of Current
Business; before that, they are unofficial es-
timates.57 These earlier estimates differ con-
ceptually from the later ones and for that
reason are too low; they were raised by the
relative amount of their understatement in
1929 (3.8 per cent).
From the same sources the ratio can be
extended to earlier years. (State and local
income taxes are unavailable before 1919 but
are small and can be neglected.) For 1919,
the ratio was 2.26 per cent; for 1917, 1.80 per
31
Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury.
Bureau of Internal Revenue, StatLstics of in-
come.
55 hisThe State Income Tax (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1932), p. 65.
561n connection with a study of the National Bu-
reau of Economic Research, as yet unpublished.
Published by the National Industrial Confer-
ence Board in its Economic Almanac (1956), p. 443.cent; and for 1916 back to 1913, the ratio
was well below one-fourth of 1 per cent. The
income tax amendment was passed in 1913,
providing this source of federal revenue for
the first time since the Civil War period.
5. VOLUME OF TRAVEL PER CAPITA
This series, shown in Table D for 1921—
51, shows miles of intercity travel divided by
the mid-year population residing in con-
tinental United States. Miles of intercity
travel were compiled from several sources.
While the figures are subject to considerable
error, they probably give an accurate pic-
ture of the year-to-year direction of change
in miles traveled. In the period covered, the
series increases in every year except 1932—
33, 1938, 1942—43, and 1947.
Beginning with 1937, estimates of the
total volume of intercity passenger traffic
from the Animal Report of the Interstate
Commerce Commission were used with slight
modification. In 1952 their coverage was
substantially broadened. These recent fig-
ures are not shown, since they are not com-
parable with the earlier data. For the years
shown in Table D, the figures are reasonably
comparable and cover all forms of intercity
travel: electric and steam railways, inland
waterways, airways, buses, and automobiles.
All the data except those for automobile
travel were reported by the companies oper-
ating the facilities and cover their respective
sectors with a fair degree of accuracy. "In-
tercity traffic" includes some commutation,
most of which falls outside the meaning of
travel as used in this study. The overstate-
ment on this account may be appreciable,
but it seems unlikely that the series grossly
misrepresents the time pattern of travel.
Some of this overstatement was eliminated
by substituting for the series used by the
ICC another series giving non-commutation
traffic on Class I steam railways.58 This sub-
stitution leaves the total series understated
by the amount of intercity non-commuta-
tion traffic on electric railways, which is
probably small, and overstated by commu-
58Fromannual volumes of Interstate Commerce
Commission, Statistics of Railways.
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tation traffic of intercity bus lines and autl
mobiles, the second of which is conceivabi
quite large. In general, the ICC figures use
to estimate travel, except for automobile
are fairly representative of major mov
ments. These figures were extended back t
1921with little loss in coverage or acci
racy.59
However, the accuracy of these figure
has little effect on that of the total travel s
ries: automobile travel has been more tha
80 per cent of the total since 1928 and wa
TABLED
ESTIMATEDVOLUME OF INTERCITY TRAVEL
PER CAPITA, 1921-51
(Milesper Year)

















1925 1,080 1941 2,301
1926 1,220 1942 2,041
1927 1,280 1943 1,941
























more than 50 per cent even in 1921. The fig
ures on automobile travel are subject to sub
stantial error, especially for the earlier years
Yet they are probably more reliable thai
one might expect them to be, knowing noth
ing of their derivation. After 1935 they an
based on broad sample surveys conducte
by the Public Roads Administration.
for earlier years, also compiled by thi
Sources for the basicdata are as follows: Non
commutation travel on Class II railways,
cited, isavailablesince 1922. For 1921, an
was made based on total railway travel (Hislorica
Statistics [ser. K-41]). Travel on inland waterways be
fore 1937 was negligible and was neglected. For ai
travel, domestic miles flown byrevenuepassenger
(Historical Statistics[ser.K-254]) were used fo
1930—36 and were assumed to be zero before 1930
For intercity bus travel, estimates were made fron
figures published in the magazine Bus Trans
ta.tion.ncy, are published in Historical Statistics
bout any explanation of their derivation.
wever, they closely follow and presum-
y are based on the consumption of motor
1. The figures on fuel consumption are de-
ed from fuel-tax revenues. Fuel consump-
n multiplied by miles driven per gallon
es an estimate of total vehicle-miles. For-
iately for our present purposes, though
fortunately for automobile users,this
iltiplier is known not to have changed
ich over the years. Thus using the same
imate of miles per gallon throughout the
nod introduces little error.
Difficulties arise, however, when total
ssenger vehicle-miles are divided into ur-
n and rural travel and when the resulting
tire for rural travel is enlarged by a factor
)resenting the average number of pas-
igers per vehicle to give total rural pas-
senger-miles. "Rural" here means "on rural
roads" and undoubtedly refers to much
more than non-commutation travel, but
there is no way to improve the derivation of
these figures, and rural travel was used as
the closest available approximation. The
conversion of total vehicle miles into rural
passenger-miles is based on various surveys,
some of which were first conducted only
after 1941. In extending the series, trends
indicated by these surveys were extrapo-
lated back to 1921. This procedure is subject
to considerable error, but these trends prob-
ably maintained a fair degree of year-to-year
stability and could not, under any ordinary
circumstances, have varied very much from
the estimated levels.80
80Thebasic data on automobile travel were taken
from Statistics (ser. K-236 and K-236a)
and Public Roads Administration, Highway StaSis-
it cs—Summary to 1945 (1947), p. 34.
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